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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
Anvnss PosssssroN-T ACKING.-To a suit in ej ectment, defendant pleaded, 
(I) the statute of limitations of seven years, claiming adverse possession 
for that length of time; (2) also twenty years' adverse possessiOn as a ibasis 
for the presumption of a grant. The possession relied upon is partially that 
of defendant's predecessor, between whom and defendant there was no 
privity. Helcl, (1) the defense of the statute of limitations is without merit. 
Successive possessions cannot be tacked to make up the period of that statute 
unless connected by privity; (2) but no privity is necessary to raise the pre-
sumption of a grant where the possession relied upon is continuous for 
twenty years, and this defense must prevail Ferguson v. Prince, (Tenn. 
1916) 190 s. w. 548. 
The defendant's claim should have been rested on the statute of limita-
tions, and not on the presumption of a lost grant. That statute should be 
considered as one of repose, and operate to defeat a title to land continuously 
held by adverse claimants for the statutory period, regardless of privity. 
This is the law of England, but is the minority rule in this country. Rich v. 
Na ff zig er, 255 I11. 98, 99 N. E. 34I;. Wishart v. McKnight, 178 Mass. 356. The 
court reached the proper conclusion by employing the fiction of a lost grant, 
but the presumption of such a grant is correctly invoked only where the 
right claimed is an easement in. land, and not the land itself. See 11 MICH. 
L. Rsv.245. 
ATToRNEY AND CI.ntNT-QUANTU:M. 1h:RUIT.-Plaintiffs, who were attorneys 
at Los Angeles, wired Mumford, who lived in New Jersey, that he was heir to 
an estate in California; sent some information and details which were used by 
Mumford; and asked to be employed as associate attorneys, stating terms. Later 
they forwarded other information at Mumford's request, and were twice con-
sulted by Mumford's New Jersey attorney as to possible employment. They 
now seek to recover quantum meruit for services rendered. Held, they are 
entitled to no compensation. In re Mumford's Estate, (Cal. 1916) 16o Pac. 667. 
To support such recovery, there must be an evident showing that the 
services were rendered with some understanding or expectation by both 
parties that compensation was to be made. In re McP/1.erson's Estate, 129 
La. 182; Paul v. Wilbur, 18g Mass •. 48. And the court found no such under-
standing in the principal case. On the contrary, it found that the informa-
tion was given under the understanding that it was necessary to an intelligent 
decision whether or not plaintiff's services were necessary, and not that they 
should be paid therefor. This presumption arose from plaintiff's own letter, 
stating that Mumford was "to be put to no expense unless we are employed 
and are successful," and this was strengthened by the fact that the plaintiffs 
said nothing as to their claim when it became apparent that they would not 
be employed. It is clear that there can be no recovery where the attorney 
acts without defendant's knowledge or consent, even though it be admitted 
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that his services were beneficial and the result valuable. Morris Ci:' Crow v. 
Kesterson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1905), 88 S. W. 277. But there may be a recovery 
on an implied contract on proof of knowledge of defendant that plaintiff was 
rendering services for him as his attorney, he expressing no dissent to their 
rendition. Davis v. Walker, 131 Ala. 204, 31 So. 554 In Paul v. Wilbur, supra, 
an attorney drew up the necessary papers for the incorPoration of a railroad, 
which was sold by the attorney's client to defendant, who proceeded to consum:. 
mate the incorporation plans. At his request, plaintiff attorney delivered said 
papers to defendant, and it was held that the defendant must have anticipated 
paying for said services, and was therefore liable. The attorney's rights against 
defendant were held not to be affected by an agreement, unknown to him, 
that defendant was taking title to the road for the benefit of the original 
client, who was to furnish the papers drawn by plaintiff. In Succession of 
Kernan, 105 La. 592, 30 So. 239, one of the several parties interested in the 
succession employed plaintiff attorney professedly for hunself and his co-
heirs. The latter stood by, making, no objection, and availing themselves 
of plaintiff's efforts, and it was held that they were also liable to him for fees. 
This case was relied on by plaintiff in In re McPhers~s Estate, supra, but 
there the one employing plaintiff did not profess to be employing him for 
the other co-heirs, but on the contrary, made them defendants in part of the 
litigation. The fact that the other, co-heirs, through their attorneys, joined 
plaintiff and his client in another phase of the suit, in which they were equally 
benefited, was held not to render them liable in any way to plaintiff. The 
fact that they had employed attorneys to represent them was emphasized 
by the court as clearly showing that they had never considered plaintiff as 
being employed for them. 
BANKRUPTCY-DiscHARGF: BARRF:D llY FRAunur.F:N'l' TRANsittt.-An insolvent 
debtor, owning a number of stores, with intention to break the leases on two 
of the unprofitalble ones, organized a corPoration, of which he held all the stock 
except a few shares held by his wife and another, conveyed to it the re-
maining stores, and after the appointment of his trustee in bankruptcy, de-
livered the corPorate stock to such trustee. Held, that the conveyance of 
his property to the corPoration hindered and delayed the creditors, hence 
was fraudulent as to them and a bar to a discharge. In re Braus, 237 Fed. 139· 
When the legal effect of the conveyance is to hinder or delay creditors, 
the intent will be pre&Umed regardless of actual motives. Logan v. Logan, 
22 Fla. 561, I Am. St. Rep. 212; Matthews v. Thompson, 186 Mass. 14, 104 
Am. St. Rep. 550. In the following cases the legal effect of transfers to cor-
porations was held to ibe to hinder and delay creditors: Mulford v. Doremus, 
6o N. J. Eq. So, 45 Atl. 688; Kelley v. Pollock and Bernheimer, 57 Fla. 459, 
49 So. 93"' 131 Am. St. Rep. IIOl; Bank v. Trebein, 59 Oh. St. 316, 52 N. E. 
834; Benton v. Minn. Tailoring Co., 73 Minn. 4g8, 76 N. W. 265; Kellogg v. 
Douglas County Bank, 58 Kan. 43, 48 Pac. 587, 62 Am. St. Rep. 5g6. But in 
the following cases the holdings were to the contrary. Plant v. Billings-Drew, 
127 Mich. II, 86 N. W. 399; Scripps v. Crawford, 123 Mich. 173, 81 N. W. 
1og8. Where the firm is solvent independently of the stock received in ex-
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change, there is of course no hindrance or delay. Coaldale Coal Co. v. State 
Bank, 142 Pa. St. 288, 21 Atl. 8n. The decision in the instant case would 
have been the same in a.11 jurisdictions since the sale "was only designed to 
change the rights of creditors and to prevent the landlords from co11ecting 
their rent." It would seem on principle that stock is .not the equivalent of 
chattels for the purposes of the creditors "because in practice the judginent 
debtor must buy in the stock at the sale, and then try to get possession of 
the chattels and sett them. He may or may not succeed in this without sub-
stantial delay or hindrance. That wi11 depend upon how surely he can 
disregard the corporate form, which in tum depends in part upon whether 
he. is the only shareholder, and· whether there have been other. debts con-
tracted by the corporation. Even then he must have another sate." 
BANKRUPTCY-Plu;~Nci>s.-J ones obtained money from a bank on a 
note to which he had forged the names of indorsers; within four months 
prior to bankruptcy, and white he was insolvent, he procured his brother-
in-law Dean, who had knowledge of the facts, to "take up" the notes, giving 
the latter a mortgage on alt of his (Jones') property. §6ob of the Bank-
ruptcy Act provides that a transfer within four months before bankruptcy 
shalt be voidable if the person receiving the same has reason to believe 
it was intended to give a preference; §67e provides that if a debtor within 
such period makes any transfer "with the intent and purpose on his part to 
hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of them," it shall be rendered· 
nu11 and void except as to purchasers in good faith and for a fair present 
consideration. In the trustee's· suit to set aside the mortgage, held, that it 
was not voidable as a preference under §6ob, but was nutt and void under 
§67e. Dean v. Davis, 37 Sup. Ct. 130. 
The mortgage was not a preference within the meaning of §6ob because 
it was given to secure a contemporary rather than a pre-existing debt and 
because its effect was to prefer the bank rather than Dean. But because Jones 
knew that he was insolvent, that he was making a preferential payment, and 
that bankruptcy would result, the lower courts were justified in concluding 
that the intent (or obviously necessary effect) of the transfer was "to hinder, 
delay, or defraud creditors" within the meaning of §67e, the operation of 
which is much broader than §6ob, and "that Dean, who knowing the facts 
co-operated in the bankrupt's fraudulent purpose, lacked the saving good 
faith." In the decision are collected other cases in which it is held that a 
mortgage is a fraudulent conveyance where taken as security for a loan 
which the tender knows is to be used to prefer favored creditors; also those 
holding the contrary where the lender does not know that improper pay-
ments to favored creditors are intended. Van Jdenstine v. National Discount 
Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582, and Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, are distinguished on 
the grounds that in the former case the ptedgee was found to have had no 
knowledge of the debtor's fraudulent intent, and in the latter case it was 
found that the debtor had no intent to hi~der, delay or defraud creditors. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIBW 
BANKROMCY-PluoRITY ro Woim:HtN AND S:stvANTS.-Bankrupt milk 
company engaged claimants to haul milk from surrounding producers to the 
factory, payment to be made according to the amount hauled, with a fixed 
minimum, the amounts per hundred paid to claimants being deducted from 
the price paid to the producers; the claimants had their own routes, supplied 
their own teams and equipment, and were entitled, if the amount of milk 
· hauled warranted, to engage assistants. §64b of the Bankruptcy Act gives 
priority to claims for wages due to "workmen, clerks, or servants." Held, 
that though claimants performed seivices and engaged in manual labor, they 
were not "workmen" or "servants" within the' meaning of the act. In re 
Footville Condensed Milk Co., 237 Fed. 136. 
Subordination and personal subservience to the employer, the element 
which, says the court, affords the ultimate test, is lacking in this case, just 
as it is in the case of draymen, cabmen, expressmen, or other independent 
contractors. The relation of master and servant excludes the right to 
assign or delegate the performance of the obligation assumed. Using one's 
own wagons, tools, etc., does not alone remove one from the servant to the 
independent contractor class. In re Yoder, 127 Fed. 894; Sproks v. Lacka-
wanna Dairy Co., 189 Fed. 287. Neither the editor of a newspaper, nor the 
manager of a business, even if he incidentally performs menial or clerical 
service or makes sales, is a workman or servant-although they are ultimately 
subservient to their employers. In re Greenberger, 203 Fed. 583; In re Zotti, 
178 Fed. 287; In re Crown Point Brush Co., 200 Fed. 882; Blessing v. Blan-
chord, 223 Fed. 35; In re Continental Paint Co., 220 Fed. 189. But a travel-
ling salesman paid by way of commissions, or a bookkeeper or steward-
though incidentally serving as directors or officers-are servants. In re New 
England Thread Co., 158 Fed. 778; In re H. 0. Roberts Co., 193 F:ed. 294; 
In re Swan Co.,, 194 Fed. 74g. It is difficult exactly to define the degree of, 
or proximity of subservience to the ultimate source of authority necessary 
to place one in one class or another. 
BANKRUP'l.'CY-PROMISts MAnr: AF'ttR Fn.ING o'J! PtTITION.-Defendant 
had ·been adjudicated a vofontary bankrupt, plaintiff being one of his cred-
itors. Defendant, wishing to obtain money to effect a composition, prom-
ised to pay plaintiff's claim in full if the latter would assist him; plaintiff 
accordingly endorsed defendant's note for the amount needed, and the com-
position was carried through. After discharge, defendant repeated his prom-
ise, but without 'further consideration. Defendant paid the note, but re-
fused to pay the balance of plaintiff's claim, and pleaded his discharge when 
sued by plaintiff. Held, that the promise to pay the balan~e of plaintiff's 
claim was fraudulent and void. Lieblein v. George, (Mich. 1916) 100 N. 
w. 538. 
In Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 57 L. Ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365, the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in a case involving facts apparently 
identical, held that the promise was good and was not discharged, because 
made after the filing of the petition. The Michigan Supreme Court does not 
refer to Zavelo v. Reeves, and its decision is explicable only on the assump-
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tion that its attention was not called to that case by counsel. As to the 
court's statement that defendant's promise was fraudulent and void, it is 
only necessary to answer, with the Za:uelo case, that though an advantage 
accrued to the plaintiff as the result of the advancement, the pleadings do not 
show that it came as the result of fraud or collusion. 
C.Al!R.n:Rs-P.ssoNAI. !NJURY.-Deceased boarded a pay-as-you-enter car, 
which was so crowded that be, together with many others, was compelled 
to ride upon the rear platform, from which he was thrown and killed by a 
sudden lurch of the car. His wife brings this action, and appeals from a 
directed verdict for defendant below. Held, ·it w.as error for court below to 
direct a verdict for defendant. La.rskowski v. Detroit United Ry., (Mich. 
1916) 159 N. W. 530. 
Plaintiff in this case presented a sufficient case for the consideration of 
the jury, inasmuch as the deceased was riding on the platform on the implied 
invitation of the defendant. He was admitted when the interior was full, 
and this was evidence of negligence on the part of defendant, but was not 
negligence per se in deceased. The question should have been submitted to 
the jury. In the case of Camden, etc. Ry. v. Hoosey, 99 Pa. 492, the Penn-
sylvania court held that the plaintiff was guilty of such negligence in stand-
ing on the platform for several minutes as to defeat his right of recovery 
for injuries resulting from being pitched therefrom, even though every 
·seat on the train was taken, and the aisles crowded, for it appeared that be 
could have found standing room inside the cars. The court stood four to 
three on the point. It was intimated that had be been "compelled thereto 
by circumstances," it would have been a question for the jury. Most courts 
disapprove of this strict ruling, due to a consideration of the congested con-
dition of traffic which prevails today. Failure to provide seats was held to 
prevent a company from taking advantage of a rule prohibiting passengers 
from standing on the platform in Willis v. Ry., 32 Barb. 399. And the gen-
eral holding is that if the company accepts one as a passenger on the plat-
form or steps, even though he might have found standing room inside, be 
is not guilty of such negligence as defeats his right of recovery. Anderson 
v. Ry., 42 Ore. 505, 71 Pac. 659. And although some courts hold a com-
pany to be negligent if it permits such overcrowding as makes it necessary 
for passengers to ride on the platform (Stuchly v. Ry., 182 Ill App. 337), the 
general rule is that the company is not liable per se for injury due to over-
crowding on the platform, but only for want of due care in preventing such 
injuries as might reasonably be expected to result from such overcrowding. 
This rests on the theory that the public today acquiesces in overcrowding. 
Lehberger v. Ry., 79 N. J. Law 134, 74 Atl. 272; McCumher v. Ry., 207 Mass. 
559, 93 N. E. 6g8; Anderson v. Ry., supra. But allowing passengers on the 
platform, the company owes them a degree of care proportionate to the 
danger to which they are exposed. LeBarge v. Ry., 138 Ia. 6g1, u6 N. W. 816. 
In the case of Norvell v. Ry., 67 W. Va. 467, 68 S. E. 288, the company was 
held liable for injuries to one necessarily on the platform, unless such 
passenger had contributed to the injury by his own negligence, thus holding 
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it negligence per se to allow overcrowding. .Pennsylvania requires toward 
one necessarily on the platform only such care as toward any other pas-
senger. Pi/dish v. Ry., 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 195. In this case the theory of 
the Camden case, supra, was followed, it being held that one remaining on 
the platform when he might have had standing room inside assumes all the 
risks of his position. But this is contrary to the weight of authority. 
CoNS'l'ITUTlONAI. LAw-IN'ttRSTAT£ CoMMtRct AND PoL1c:e Powr:a.-The 
Federal Supreme Court on January 22, 1917, rendered decisions in three cases, 
appealed from the district courts of Michigan, South Dakota and Ohio, 
wherein the so called "Blue Sky'' laws were upheld as constitutional These 
laws get their popular name from the fact that they were made to regulate 
those promoters whose promises were "as limitless as the blue sky." Brief-
ly stated, it was held that reasonable restrictions upon the operations of 
those engaged in the sale of "securities" was not a violation of the interstate 
commerce clause but was a justifiable exercise of the police power of the 
state. Merrick v. Halsey & Co., (Michigan), 37 Sup. Ct. 227; Caldwell v. 
Siou1' Falls Stock Yards Co., (South Dakota), 37 Sup. Ct. 224, and Hall v. 
Geiger-Jones Company, (Ohio), 37 Sup. Ct. 217. 
·A full discussion of these cases appears on pages 36g-385 of this issue. 
°CoNsT1TuTlONAI. LAw-RSL1c1ous ·Lmr:RTY.-A statute of Alabama made 
it a misdemeanor for any person to treat or offer to treat diseases of 
human beings by any system of treatment whatsoever without a license. 
Con:e, §7564. An ordinance of the city of Birmingham made all misde-
meanors against the laws of the State also offences against the city. De-
fendant, who was not a licensed physician, employed prayer in treating a 
patient for various diseases, but also examined and massaged the affected 
parts. He contended that he was exercising his religion as embraced in the 
teachings of the Altrurian Church, and that the ordinance denied religious 
liberty in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and the State 
of Ala:bama. Held, that the ordinance was constitutional and also that the 
defendant practiced medicine without a license within the meaning· of the 
ordinance. Fealey v. City-of Birmingham, (Ala. 1916) 73 So. 29(). 
It is well settled that the regulation of the practice of medicine is a valid 
exercise of the police power. State v. McAninch, 172 Ia. 9(), 154 N. W. 399; 
People v. Tom J. Chong, 28 Cal. App. 121, 151 Pac. 553; In re Ambler, II 
Okl: Cr. 449, 148 Pac. 1o61; McNaughton v. Johnson, 37 Sup. Ct. 178. The 
principal case did not decide that prayers alone without recourse to ma-
terial or human agencies would constitute practicing medicine under the 
statute, since the defendant did not limit his operations to mere prayers. 
This question was decided in the case of People v. Cole, (N. Y. 1916) u3 
N. E. 790. In that case the defendant was indicted for practicing medicine 
without registration. At the trial he proved that he was a member of the 
Christian Science Church and that he gave a "treatment'' by interposing with 
God that the disease might be cured, it being a tenet of the church that such 
prayer would completely cure the disease. The court in deciding the case 
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held that the defendant did practice medicine within the meaning of the 
statute, but a new trial was ordered because the trial court in instructing 
the jury failed to recognize a clause in the statute excepting the practic~ of 
the religious tenets of any church. The reasoning in this case was followed 
in PeoPle v. McTier, I84 IU. App. 635. In the recent case of Crane v. Jahn--
so1i, 37 Sup. Ct. I76, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the va-
lidity of a California statute regulating the practice of medicine, which spe-
cifically excepted "treatment by prayer" and the "practice of religion." In 
that case the person objecting to the statute did not pretend to use prayer 
in his treatment.· 
CoN'l'RACTs-MuTUALITY.-Plaintiff and defendant entered into an agree-
ment in writing whereby defendant, a manufacturer of sugar, agreed to 
sell, and plaintiff as a wholesale dealer in groceries, agreed to buy, all of 
plaintiff's "August requirements" of sugar at a fixed price. Sugar ad-
vanced in price. Plaintiff demanded of defendant an amount of sugar alleged 
to be the ordinary and normal quantity used by plaintiff for his trade. De-
fendant declined to deliver. Held, the co,ntract was invalid for want of 
mutuality. Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 237 Fed. 278. 
That the plaintiff's obligation to buy none of its "August requirements" 
from any person other than the defendant:, was detriment tQ the promisee, and 
sufficient consideration to support th~ contract, the court agreed. The.pres-
ence of consideration should furnish the only element of mutuality required. 
The court further declared tha,t an agreement to buy and sell the require-
ments of an established business in which the use of the thing "required" 
is but incidental to the carrying on of the business itself is valid and should 
be upheld, but that invalidity results when the amount of the commodity 
to be purchased is determined by the mere wish, desire, or caprice of the 
yurchaser. This distinction rests on no sound legal principle. The demand 
for "certainty," and for the elimination of "caprice" has probably resulted 
from two considerations, vi2;: the desire to simplify the question of damages, 
and the good policy of minimizing a large element of speculation which exists 
in such contracts. But the difficulty of ascertaining the damages of a breach 
can in no way touch the' validity of the agreement, and if the state is to·fur-. 
nish the business sagacity which the parties lack, it should be offered by the 
legislature, not the courts. In a recent, and better reasoned, case involving 
the same question it was held that if the intention of the contract be clear, 
the mere uncertainty of the amount involved does not invalidate it. Ramey 
Lumber Co. v. Schroeder Lumber Co., 237 Fed. 39. This is sound. It cannot 
be explained on principle how an option which results from the very terms 
of the contract, and for which there is admittedly sufficient consideration, 
can defeat the validity of the agreement. 
CoRPORATIONs-Ho1.mNG STOCK IN loCAI. CoRPORATION BY Foruo;rGN CoR-
POltATION IS "DOING BusrNJ;ss" IN TH£ STATS.-A Maine corporation owned 
practically all the stock of an Illinois corporation organized to sell life in-
surance. Under its Maine charter the corporation could not sell life insur-· 
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ance. Under the Illinois statutes it :was unlawful for one corporation to 
hold the stock of another. Held, that the Maine corporation was "doing 
business" in Illinois so as to make it amenable to the Illinois statutes pro-
hibiting such holding, and since the whole scheme was an attempt by the 
promoters to do indirectly what they could not do directly, it must be declared 
illegal. Central Life Securities Co. v. Smith, et al., (C. C. A. 1916), 236 
Fed. 170. 
The weight of authority is clearly against this case. Mannington v. Hock-
ing Valley Ry., 183 Fed. 133; Peterson v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 
364; Conley v. Mathieso'n Alkali Wks., 190 U. S 4o6; People v. American Bell 
Telephone Co., n7 N. Y. 241; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 
29 Fed. 17; Gilchrist v. Helena, &c Ry., 47 Fed. 593; Toledo Traction, Light 
& Power Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643. And the weight of reason seems also 
with the. majority rule. Thus in People v. Bell Co., supra, RUGER, J., says: 
"Doing business" in the state "must be determined from the actual character 
of the business carried on * * * and not from the existence of any un-
exercised powers reserved to it by its contracts; for the material question is 
whether it has, in fac~ done business within the state, and, if so, what was 
the nature, character and extent, and not whether it pcssesses the natural 
or contractual right to carry on such business." And in United States v. 
American &c. Co., supra, JACKSON, J., pomts out that it is not sufficient to give 
jurisdiction in personam over foreign corporations that they have property 
rights, however extensive, within the district, or that they have pecuniary 
interests, however valuabl~, in a business managed and conducted by others. 
So control or ownership of stock is merely a status, or at most, a power; 
it is a right, not a transaction; passive, not active. It is elementary that a 
corp0ration holding shares ·is a distinct entity from the corporation whose 
shares are held, and that the latter is not the agent of the former so as to 
confer personal liability, unless secondarily by statute. In the instant case 
no reasons are assigned for departing from the majority rule. Three cases 
are cited: Col. Tru,rt Co. v. M. B. Works, 172 Fed. 313; Dittman v. Dist. 
Co. of Am., 64 N. J. Eq. 537; and Martin v. Offlo Stove Co., 78 Ill. App. 105. 
Of these the latter two are not in point but Col. Trust Co. v. M. B. Works not 
only fully sustains the instant case but points out the basis for the differen-
tiation from the main line of authority. In that case a Delaware corpora-
tion was organized to hold the stock of a Pennsylvania brick manufactur-
ing corporation, in order to evade the stricter corporation laws of Pennsyl-
vania. The court simply proceeded to strip away the corporate cloak assumed 
to evade the law. See Metcalf v. Arnold, IIO Ala. 18o; United States v. 
United Shoe Machinery Co., 234 Fed. 127, IS Mic:B:. L. REv, 78. So in the in-
stant case it appears that the incorporators were, as the court states, trying 
to do indirectly what they could not legally accomplish .directly. In all the 
cases cited for the majority rule it will be found that the holding was wholly 
innocent in its purpose, and in all but Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 
supra, it was merely incidental to the rights of the parties involved, so that 
there were neither motives of public policy nor fraud to justify interference 
by the courts. Caesar v. Capell, 83 FecL 403; Blodgett v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 
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I20 Fed. 8g3. Thus it seems plain that the instant case is limited in its effe.ct 
to removing from the application of the general rule ·those holding companies 
organized primarily to evade the law. . 
CoRPORATIONs-Issm: oF STOCK FOR PA'mN'tS UNDr:R MICHIGAN S'tA'tU'ttS. 
-The corporation was capitalized at $2oo,ooo of which $Ioo,ooo was sub-
scribed and $2<>,200 paid in cash and property. Also a contract was entered 
into by which $10,000 in stock was issued to A, B, & C in return for their 
Promise to assign the American patent, when it ~hould be issued, to an air 
compressor for automobiles. Later, when it was found impossible to obtain 
an American patent, the directors of the corporation voted to accept the 
foreign patents already held by A, B, & C in lieu of the American patent. 
Held, that this contract was in fraud of the other stockholders and that the 
stock issued to A, B, & C should be delivered up to be canceled, and 
they barred from sharing in distribution of corporate assets on dissolution. 
In re American Air Compressor Co., (Mich. I916), I6o N. W. 388. · 
Clause 6 of §2 of the General Incorporation Laws of Michigan (How. 
ANN. S'tA't. §9533) provides that 10% of the authorized capital stock of a 
corporation .must be paid in cash or property, and in the latter case there 
must be affidavits by at least three of the incorporators averring actual trans-
fer to the corporation, and swearing to the actual value. Here it seems that 
$10,000 in stock was to be issued on the mere possibility of a patent, and 
it is difficult to conceive how a patent right in futuro could have been trans-
ferred to the corporation or how it could have satisfied the further require-
ment of the statute that it be ·transferable by the corporation and subject 
to levy and execution by the corporate creditors. The matter was not brought 
up in the case and was not mentioned in the opinion, as it was not necessary 
to decide the case. This is regrettabl~. In many corporations a.large amount 
of stock is issued for patent rights. The Michigan statute is in terms most 
rigid. The evaluation of a patent right, which must ·be sworn to, is a diffi-
cult matter at best, and it is of the greatest importance to a large number 
of honest and well-intentioned citizens that the courts define just what is re-
quired of incorporators who wish to issue shares for patent rights which are 
necessarily more or less conjectural in value. · 
Evmr:Ncr:-EXPr:R't Tr:s'tIMONY NO't .ADMissmr.r: ON Qur:snoN oF SIGNA-
'ttrar: BY MARK.-A will was signed by a feeble man, 92 years of age, who 
made a mark as a substitute for his signature. Three witnesses testified that 
the testator had made the mark; t,wo testifying that the testator had made 
the mark unassisted, while the third testified that he had aided the testator's 
feeble hand in making the mark. Plaintiffs contesting the will offered ex-
pert testimony to show that this-was not the mark of the testator. Held, 
that the court properly excluded the testimony, as a mark is not "writing" 
within the meaning of New York Laws I88o, Ch. 36, and Laws I888, Ch. 555, 
which permit the comparison of writing by experts. In re Caift:ey's Will, 
(I916) I6I N. Y. Supp. 277. . 
The court decided this case upon the authority of In re Hopki~, 172 N. 
Y. 36o, 65 N. E. 173, 65 L. R. A. 95, 9:? Am. St. "Rep. 746,- w~ere )i wa5 ~-
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pressly held that a mark was not writing wjthin the meaning of the above 
statutes. A close examination of those statutes shows that they only extend 
the field of expert testimony "and do not declare what constitutes writing, 
so that the court would have decided that a mark is not writing subject to 
comparison by experts, without the existence of the statute. The cases hold-
ing with the instant case go on the theory that these disputed marks have 
no prevailing characteristic which would enable an expert to speak, with any 
·degree of certainty, as to the identity of the person who made them; hence 
a comparison is improper. Some of ·the cases holding to the above theory 
are Jackson, e~ dem. Van Dusen v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 144. 4 Am. Dec. 
330; Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153; Shinkle v. Crock, 17 Pa. St. 159· An-
other line of cases go upon the theory that, since the jury must compare the 
mark to see if it is genuine, the companson should be made more intelligible 
by comparisons made by experts. They hold that 5uch comparison is pos-
sible; for marks made by hands trembling with old age, or by illiterate per-
sons, have characteristics of their own differing from those made by steady 
hands and with intelligent design. State v. Tice, 30 Ore. 457, 48 Pac. 367. 
On the question of comparison of cross-marks there is also a division of 
opinion. Travers v. Snyder, JS 111. App. 379, holds that cross-marks can not. 
be distinguished so as to produce dependable evidence unless by some strong 
proof it js shown that the ;signer's mark had some peculiar distinguishing· 
characteristic. See also State v. Byrd, 93 N. C. 624- The case of Shank v. 
Butsch, 28 Ind. 19, strongly intimates that cross-marks are writing and sub-
ject to the same rule as other signatures. 
' . 
I ' 
Evm~N~-UNAUTHtN'tICATtD BooKs oF ENTRY.-Plaintiff claims on con-
tracts for sawing lumber for the defendant. Carruth, an employee of plaintiff, 
kept account of the work done on tallylboards atthe mill, from which, as well 
as from oral reports ot Carruth, plaintiif made up the book admitted in 
evidence. Carruth was out of the state and was not produced to authenti-
cate these figures, nor was any attempt made to obtain his deposition; on 
this ground defendant objected to the admission of the book. Held, this book 
. was properly admitted, on grounds of convenience and necessity, and that 
such admission must be left to the discretion of the trial court. Squires v. 
O'Connell, (Vt. 1916) 99 Atl._ 268. 
The court justified the entry of the book without authentication on grounds 
of practical convenience. Formerly, when employers, engaged in small in-
' dustries, had only a few employees, strict rules of authentication may have 
been quite practicable; lbut nowadays large concerns employ thousands of 
men, many of whom are obliged to make individual-reports from which the 
.books must finally be made up, and the strict rule would work severe in-
convenience. The courts are facing this practical difficulty, and are as above, 
leaving it to the discretion of the trial court to determine when such au-
thentication may be dispensed with. The reliability of the present systems 
of bookkeeping as opposed to the old slipshod methods, seems to be another 
reason for relaxing the rigid rules of authentication. 2 W1GM0Rt, Evm., 
§§1521, 1530;. Griflith v. Boston & Maine Ry. Co., 87 Vt. 278, 8g Atl. 220; 
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Osborne v. Grand T. Ry. Co., 87 Vt. 104, 88 Atl. 512, Ann. Cas. 1916C 74 
Some cases hold that if the party who made the entry cannot be compelled 
to appear, his testimony may be dispensed with. Vinol v. Gilman, 21 . W. 
Va. 321, 45 Am. Rep. 562. Many courts still apply strictly the rule requiring 
authentication. Randall v. Borden, ('!'ex. Civil App.), 164 S. W. lo63; Little 
Rock Granite Co. v. Dallas County, 66 Fed. 522, C. C. A. 620 
EVIn~NC£-V.AI,US oF Suvicr:s Musmu:n BY UNION SCAI,~-Plaintiff sued 
on a mechanic's lien to recover for labor and materials used in doing plumb-
ing for defendant. Evidence was admitted showing the union rate of wages 
for journeymen plumbers. Defendant objected because it had not 'been shown 
that the contract was based upon union prices. Held, that the trial court 
properly admitted the evidence. Schalich v. Bell, (Cat. 1916), 161 Pac. 983. 
In determining the value of services courts have quite generally excluded 
evidence tending to show· rewards for similar services in analogous cases, 
because it raises too many collateral issues; yet it would seem that such 
a method of showing the proper amount of recovery would be most accu-
rate. Harris v. Russell, 93 Ala. 59, 9 So. 541; McKnight v. Detroit & M. 
Ry. Co., 135 Mich. 307, 97 N. W. 772. In Seurer v. Horst, 31 Minn. 479, 18 
N. W .. 283, proof of wages received by another employee of defendant was 
excluded as not being evidence of the value of plaintiff's services. 'l'o the 
same ef,Iect is Forey v. Western Stage Co.,' 19 Ia. 535. 'l'o show the reason-
ableness of fees charged for services of a physician or an attorney, evidence 
is usually rejected as to fees c;harg<;_d in previous similar cases. Collins v. 
Fowler, 4 Ala. 647; Robbins v. Harvey, 5 Conn. 335. Some courts allow 
value received for similar services to be shown, but in such cases it is always 
difficult to show sufficient similarity. Maurice v. Hunt, 8o Ark. 476, 97 S. W. 
664; Peters v. Davenport, 104 Ia. 625, 74 N. W. 6; Kram.men v. Meridean 
M. Co.; 58 Wis. 399, 17 N. W. 22. '!'he practical·difficulty of establishing the 
value of personal services is ·well illustrated in a New York case where the 
plaintiff had personally cared for a very corpulent man, kept his house, 
and done his sewing. Plaintiff's witiiess was allowed to show what she was 
accustomed to pay for such services under similar circumstances. '!'he court 
recognized the difficulty of the situation and remarked, "In this we see no 
error. It was, as we have said, the best that the situation permitted the 
plaintiff to do." Edgecombe v. Buckliout; 146 N. Y. 332, 40 N. E. 991, 28 
L. R. A. 816. In view of the present difficultj of determining the value of 
services of the various trades, it w:ould seem that the union scale of wages 
would be a' dependable and fair basis. Incidentally, the court's recognition 
of union wages as a fair scale offers a bit of encouragement to labor or-
ganizations. 
INJUNCTION-To Prum:N'r SoI.ICI'rA'rION OF Cusro:m;Rs BY FoIWU EiM-
no~-For a number of years the defendant was a driver and solicitor 
for the plaintiff laundry company. He left the employ of th~ latter sud-
denly and began soliciting the plaintiff's customers for a rival laundry. Few, 
if any, of the customers knew of the defendant's change of employment. 
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',the lower coitrt ·granted an injuttction restraining the defendant from sO-
liciting the business, but not from ,receiving the laundry, of the plaintiff's 
'customers. The plaintiff appealed, contending that the defendant should be 
restramed from receiving laundry f!"om the plaintiff's customers. Held, the 
decision of the trial court should be affirmed. New Method Laundry Co. v. 
MacCann., (Calif. I9I6) I6I Pac. 990. · 
An express agreement not to use business secrets, which an employee has 
learned, iS not necessary. in order to grant equitable relief. Stevens & Co. v. 
Snles, 29-R. I. 399, ·7I·Atl. 802, 20 L. R. A. N. S. 933; MacBeth-Evans Glass 
Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688. The ground of the jurisdiction 
ls to prev~t . a breach of the trust and confidence necessary between em-
ployer and ~uiployee In Empire Steam Laundfy Co. v. Lozier, I65 Cal 9S, 
130 Pae; n8o, 44 L. R. .A. N. S. II59, the same court held, in a case pre-
cisely similar, that the defendant should be ··restrained from soliciting or 
receiving laundry from the plaintiff's customers. The decree in this case 
has 1been criticized as being too broad. See I CAI.. L. Rtv. 38s. It is possible 
that even the decree in the principal case might be said to be too broad. 
There are some well considered cases which hold that an employee may 
roticit his foOiier employer's customers so long as lie does so in ·a fair 
!Danner. · Gra!'d Un{on Tea Co. v. Dodds, I64 Mich. so, I28 N. W. IClgO, 31 
L. R. _A. N. S. 200;. Robb v. Green, [I89S]2 Q. B. I. This doctrine seems 
just, for it puts th.e employee under no disability to earn a living because 
of his former employment. There are, however, decisions in which in-
junctions have teen granted, quite as sweeping in extent as in the principal 
ease. People's Coat, Apron 6: Towel Co. v. Light, IS7 N. Y. Supp. IS; 
Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, supra. 
MAruuA~UN~ AND Nm~-The defendant . and her uncle were 
domiciled in the state of Maryland where there was a statute which forbade 
a marriage between uncle and niece· and declared it to be void. They went 
to Rhode Island and were married, the marriage being valid there. They 
came :t>ack to Maryland and the husband died soon after, leaving mo~t of his 
propertY to the defendant. The plaintiff, a nephew of the husband, sued to 
have the marriage declared null and void. Held, tbat"the marriage being 
valid in Rhode Island was valid in Maryland-at least could not be questioned 
after the death of one of the parties. Fensterwald v. Bur.k (Md. I916) g8 
Atl .. 358. . 
·The general rule is that a -marriage valid at the place where performed is 
vatid everywhere. Sutton v. Warren, IO Met. (Mass.) 4s1; Harrison v. 
Harrison, 22 Md. 468. To this ntle it has been held there are two exceptions: 
the firiit a marriage which is regarded as inces~ous or contrary to the laws 
of God and· Christendom; the ·second a marriage which is contrary j:o a 
settled state policy and prol.!toited by statute. Pennegar v. State of Tennessee, 
Bi Tenn. 244, 2 L. R. A. 703. ·It is universally held that a marriage between 
parties in the lineal descending or ascending line or between brother and 
sister is incestuous and contrary to the laws of Grid. STORY, CoNFLICT OF 
t.Aws, ii3, II4 There, is more aifference of opinion as to marriages between 
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11ncle and niece, parties in the third degree of relationship. Their marriage 
is not generally regarded as being inc~tuqus and void on that ground. 
Bo..wers v. Bowers, IO Rich. Eq. ( S. C.) 551; W eisbcrg v. Weisberg, g8 N. Y. 
Supp. 260. In Weisberg v. W eisbcrg a marriage between an uncle and niece 
was declared valid, the parties having lived together fourteen years. There 
was at that time no statute against such a marriage in New York. It is now 
forbidden in practically every state in the Union. Pi;cK, DoY. Ra. 2. Al-
though such a marriage is forbidden and declared void in some states, courts 
of many such states will uphold its validity, if it is valid where performed, 
as not ·being contrary to a settled state policy and affecting good morals. 
Harrison v. Harrison, supra; Schofield v. Schofield, SI Pa. Super. Ct 564 
See comment on this case in 61 UNIV. o:r' PA. LAW Rl;v. 490. Contra, Hayes 
v. Rollins, 68 N. H. I9I. In the case of United States v. Rodgers, 109 Fed. 
886, a wife who was the niece of her husband naturalized her~ was refused 
admission to this country, the court holding such a marriage to be shocking 
to the moral sense and contrary to the policy of Pennsylvania laws. The fact 
that the parties have gone outside of the jurisdiction to marry in order to 
evade the laws of the state of their domicile has been held to make no differ-
ence. Schofield v. Schofield, supra. • 
l!Fl~li!~·~··· 
PoWJ:Rs-Er<.11£Cr OF CovtNANT ro A:PPOINT.-A decedent, having an 
equitable estate for life, had power to make such disposition of the estate 
"for the benefit of himself and his children, by a l~st will and testament, or 
by an appointment in the nature of a last will and testament, as he may de-
sire." In 1905 he made a will in which he appointed $25,000.00 to the defend-
ant in pursuance of a covenant that in consideration of $51000.00 he would 
execute such appointment by an irrevocable will. Later he made a new will 
iii which the power was executed in a manner inconsistent with the pro-
visions "of the contract Held that the covenantee Was not entitled to specific 
performance, and since the appointees received nothing that was the property 
of the donee, there was nothing in their hal}ds that equity could charge with 
a trust Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer, (N. Y. l9I6) II4 N. E. 
389. 
Equity will not enforce specific performance of a covenant which the 
donee of a testamentary power .makes to the effect that he will awoint in 
favor of certain objects, if he later makes appointments valid otherwise but 
inconsistent therewith. In Re Parkin, [1892]- 3 Ch. 5IO; In Re Bradshaw, 
[1902] I Ch. 342; Wilks v. Burns, 6o Md. 64 But if an appointment is made 
in accordance with a prior contract, the fact that the donee is benefited by 
preventing a liability for breach arising, does not make the appointment bad. 
Coffin v. Cooper, 2 Dr. & Sm. 367; Palmer v. Locke, 15 Ch. D. 294 The 
reason underlying the rule is that to grant sp'ecific performance would enlarge 
a testamentary power into a power which could be exercised by deed, which 
would defeat the intention of the donor. Reid v. Boushall, 107 N. C. 34S. 
Where one had an inchoate power to appoint by deed upon reaching a certain 
age, a covenant to appoint, made prior to attaining the prescribed age, was 
enforced by equity as a defective execution in Johnson v. Touchet, 37. L.1. R. 
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(N. S.) 25. When, ho{vever, the power may only be exercised by will, the 
covenant to appoint cannot be said to be a. defective execution, and will not 
. be aided in equity. Gaskins v. ·Finks,!)() Va. 384, 19 S. E. 166. In Learned v. 
Talmadge, 26 Barb. 44,.1, a conveyance was made by the donee of a power to 
one of the objects, and covenants were made that he would not make any dis-
position of the property by any will and that all of his interest was relinquished 
and extinguished. Nevertheless appointments subsequently made were held 
valid as against graritees of the covenantee. See also Re Collard and Duck-
worth, 16 Ont. Rep. 735. But the execution of a mortgage with full covenants 
of warranty by the donee was held to estop him from inconsistent dealings 
with the estate, and the appointees under the will had no further rights, in 
Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N. E. 1004- Though an affirmative con-
tract to appoint will not be specifically enforced, yet where the donee cove-
.nanted .that ·he would not exercise his power so as to reduce the share which a 
particular beneficiary would receive on a default of appointment, it was held 
to be a release of the power to ·appoint, and the power thereafter could only 
be exercised subject to the fetter or limitation thus imposed by the negative 
covenant, and appointments made inconsistent therewith were set aside to such 
anc:xtentaswouldsatisfythecovenant. Re Evered, [1910] 2 Ch. 147. A release 
of a power can be made in England by virtue of statute, CoNVSYANCING Ac:r:· 
1881, .§52. A power in gross might be released, but the court refused to 
consent to the proposition that the donee could by virtue of a "gainful agree-
ment'' bind himsel(to refrain fro~ the exercise of a power, T.homso~s E~ec­
utor v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489, 528. The court in the principal case did not 
decide whethei: the contract was enforceaple against the estate of the decedent, 
or void in totoK 
SAI.~DA'YAGts FOR B~cR oF W AP.RANTY oF SJW>s.-Defendant sold 
plaintiff melon seeds and expressly guaranteed them to be of a particular' 
variety known as "Klekley SweetS." An examination of the seeds would not 
have disclosed whether they were of this brand or not. Plaintiff prepared 
soil and planted the seeds, which produced melons of a different and jnferior 
variety; and plaintiff sued defendant for breach of warranty. Held, that the 
measure of recoverable damages was the value of a crop such as would 
ordinarily have been produced that year bad the seeds been as warranted, 
less the value of the crop actually produced. Ford v. Farmer's E~ch., (Tenn. 
1916) l8g s. w. 368 • 
. Where seeds are warranted to be true to name and a crop of an inferior 
quality is produced, it has generally been held that the measure of damages 
should be the difference between the ·value of the crop Taised and the value 
of the crop which would have been produced had the seeds been as guar-
anteed. This is the rule followed in the principal case and is supported by 
Passenger v. Thorburn, 35 Ba11b. (N. Y.) 17; Schutt v. Baker, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 
536; Flick v. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 392. Where no crop is produced at all, or 
if it is worthless, some cases allow us damages the expense of preparing the 
soil (less the general benefit to the land therefrom), the price paid for the 
seed, and the loss sustained from having the land lie idle. Phelps v. Elyria 
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Milling Co., 12 Oh. Dec. 6g5; Vaugh~s Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla. 
7o8. In following this rule practically the same result is obtained as is 
reached by the cases in the first class, since the loss sustained from haying 
the land idle is usually equivalent to the expected profits. A large number 
of cases refuse to allow a recovery for losses due to the idleness of the 
land and reach a different conclusion from that of the foregoing cases. 
F~rris v. Comstock, Ferre & Co., 33 Conn. 513; Butler v. Moore, 68 Ga. 78o; 
Reiger v. Worth Co., 127 N. C. 230. 
SPi>CIFIC PtRFORMANCE-01" Bun.DING CoNTRAC't.-The defendant construc-
tion company agreed to construct a drainage system for an organized dis-
trict, and agr.eed to receive monthly payments as the work progressed. The 
first payments were to be in cash and the remainder in notes. After the 
work was more than half completed and the defendant had received all the 
cash under the contract, the defendant refused to proceed. Tlie work was in 
imminent danger of being destroyed, and the surrounding lands injured by 
overflow. It appeared that it was practically impossible to get another con.:. 
tractor to complete the work within a reasonable time. Held, that upon a 
finding that the notes were amply secured the lower court properly decreed 
specific performance of the contract. Board of Commissioners v. Wills & 
Sons, (D. C. 1916), 236 Fed. 362. · 
It is often stated that equity will not enforce a building contract because 
to do so would require constant-supervision by the court. Armour v. Con-
nolly, (N. J. 1901) 49 Atl. 1II7.i LaHogue Drainage Dist. v. 'Watts, 179 Feet 
6go. FRY, SPWFIC Pm'oRMANO: (5th Ed.) 47. However, as early as 1694, 
the court of chancery granted specific performance of a contract to build a 
house at the petition of the land-owner's heir. Holt v. Holt, I Eq. Abr. 
274, p. II. Specific performance is often granted in cases where the defend-
ant ha5 agreed to build a structure on his own laiid, more especiatiy when 
the land is conveyed to the defendant by the plairitiff upon that condition. 
Murray v. N. W.R. R. Co., 64 S. C. 520, 42 S. E. 617; Parrott v. Atl. & N. 
C. R. R. Co., 165 N. C. 295, 81 S. E. 348. These cases show that there is 
no inherent disa:bility in a court of equity, preventing it from granting spe-
cific performance of a building contract. In most cases wh.ere the structure 
is to be on the plaintiff's land the remedy at law is perfectly adequate, for 
the plaintiff can hire another to perform the <:ontract and recover damages 
from the defendant in an action at law. In such cases specific performance 
is rightly refused. Likewise a court is justified in denying equitable relief 
where the contract is too indefinite, even when the remedy at Jaw is in-
adequate. Ward v. Newbold, II5 Md. 689, 81 Atl. 793; see also Jones v. 
Parker, 163 Mass. 564- In the principal case, however, the remedy at law 
is clearly inadequate and the terms of the contract sufficiently definite to 
grant specific performance. 
Tl;:NANCY IN CoM:MON-CoNVSYANO: BY ConNAN't OF SPW.FIC PRoPmaY.-
A tenant in common who owned an undivided five-eighteenths of a tract of 
land comprising ninety-nine acres, deeded twenty-seven acres of same to de-
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fendant, describing the portion so conveyed by metes and bounds. Com-
plainants, who are also part owners of the land, bring this suit against de-
fendant alone for partition of such particular part. Held, defendant is en-
titled to have the ~tire tract valued, and have set apart to it, in severalty, 
such portion as represents five-eighteenths in value of the whole, and if upon 
such valuation it shall appear that the twenty-seven acres are not of greater 
value than five-eighteenths of the· entire tract the decree will direct the al-
lotment thereof to the defendant, Qr if a part thereof is found to be of such 
value, such part should be allotted. Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 235 
Fed. 465. 
As to the exact interest which is passed by such a deed, the courts are 
· not agreed. They do agree, however, that the grantee has no absolute right· 
on partition to have the described land allotted to him, and that the de-
termination reached must leave the rights of other tenants unprejudiced. 
Beyond this there is conflict. It was early held that a conveyance of this 
sort was absolutely void. Griswold v. Johnson, 5 Conn. 363, but that de-
cision was later modified by the same court when it concluded that the 
deed would be validated if the other co-tenants choose to. affirm it. In some 
jurisdictions the effect of the gtant is contingent upon the result of the 
partition suit. I~ by chance the portion conveyed happens to be set off as 
1)ie share of the grantor it passes, otherwise the grantee takes nothing. 
Cressey v. Cressy, 215 Mass, 65, 102· N. E. 314; Kenoye v. Brown, 82 Miss. 
007, 35 So. 163; Benedict v. Torrenf, 83 Mich. 181, 47 N. W. 129. Another 
vie~ .is that llie grantee t:ikes the interest of the grantor, whatever that may 
be." Lessee of White v. Sayre, 2 Ohio IIO. The decision in the principal case 
is more favoraole to the grantee than any of these, since he acquires the 
interest. of his grantor, and unless other equities interfere is, upon partition, 
allotted 'the land described in ·his deed. This determination may be open 
to the objection that the equity of the grantee, in the land described, is 
given more weight· than would be accorded a desire on the part of the 
grantor to •be allotted some particular portion. · This might lead to color-
able conveyances. Such a possibility would be obviated by permittjng the 
deed to pass the interest of the grantor, but denying it any influence on the 
result of the partition. The instant case is supported by the following: 
Ha"ell v. Mason, 170 Ala. 282, 54 So. 164; Worthington -v. Staunton, 16 W. 
Va. 209; Young v. Edwards, 33 s. c .. 404 II s. E. 1o66; Maverick v. Barney, 
88 Tex. 56o, 32 S. W. 5I2; MoonJshine Co. v. Dunman, SI Tex. Civ. App. 
159, III S. W. I6I. 
TRIAl.-Stl'ARATION oF JURY AFT£R FIN.AI, StmMISSION oF CASE.-In a 
civil ease the jury stated to the associate, after the judge had left the court 
one evening, that 'they had agree~ to a verdict on two counts but could not 
agree on the third, and they then separated for the night. Coming before 
the judge the next morning they gave a verdict on all three counts. Judg-
ment was entered on the verdict sc; rendered and accepted. Held, that the 
verdict was valid inasmuch as no prejudice was shown. Fan.shaw v. Knowles, 
(1916] 2 K. B. 539: 
'RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
The precise point raised in the principal case apparently had never been 
passed upon definitely by an Engli~h court prior to- this time. The counsel for 
the appellant urged that the rule applicable to criminal trials should govern. the 
decision of this, a civil case. To quote from a recent leading case that rule 
is as follows: ''If a juror after the judge has summed up in any criminal 
trial separates from his colleagues, and not being under the control of the 
court, converses or is in a position to converse with other persons, it is 
an irregularity which in the opinion of the court renders the whole proceed-
ings abortive, :md the only course open to the court is to discharge the 
jury and commence the proceedings afresh." Rex. v. Ketteridge, [1915] 
l K. B. 467. The court deciding that case did not think it necessary to con-
sider what had actually taken place, nor whether the irregularity had in fact 
prejudiced the prisoner. However, there was in that case no suggestion 
that this same rule would apply in the case of a civil trial. While, as stated 
above, this precise question was treated by the court as one of first im-
pression, there is strong evidence that at an early date the strict rule applic-
able to criminal cases was relaxed under some circumstances insofar as civil 
trials were concerned. Con, LITTLS'!ON, 227; 3 BLACKSTONE, Col.DI., 377; 
Lord St. John v. Abbott, Barnes 441, 94 Eng. Rep. 994- The principal case 
states definitely for the first time that "the rule is that when there has been 
a separation, that is a circumstance which with other circumstances ought 
to be taken into account and dealt with by the court." In the United States 
the general rule is that a separation in civil trials must be prejudicial to in-
validate the verdict, even when the separation takes place before the jury 
have arrived at a verdict. SpeiJcer v. John.son, 185 Mich. 85, l5I N. W. 684; 
Liverpool &c. Ins. Co. v. N. & M. Friedman Co., 133 Fed. 713, 66 C. C. A. 
543· It thus appears that the English Court of Appeal, without referring in 
any way to ,American decisions, has reached a conclusion identical with the 
rule which has always been in force in this country. 
Wn.r.s-EFacT oF RsvocATION UPON FAII.~ oF TH£ PURPOst FOR Wmc:e: 
IT WAS MAD:t.-Under a marriage settlement for her life, with remainder as 
she should appoint, testatrix made an appointment for the benefit of her 
daughter, M., then later by codicil expressly revoked the" same, and made a 
new appointment whereby the fund was to be held in trust for the benefit of 
the said M., for life, then to such other daughters of testatrix as should 
survive M. The new appointment in the codicil was void under the rule 
against perpetuities, and M. now seeks to determine whether the codicil, be-
ing void as an appointment, was also void as a revocation of the earlier ap-
pointment. Held, that the intention of the testatrix was I).Ot to revoke the 
prior appointment in any case, but only for the purpose of carrying out the 
altered appointment, and since the purpose of the revocation had failed, the 
revocation also failed. In re Bernard's Settlement, [1916] l Ch. 552, 85 L. J. 
Ch. 414-
Where a will or codicil is duly executed by a competent person, but 
0
its 
provisions cannot be given effect, as when void as a perpetUity, (Altrock v. 
Vanderburgh, 25 N. Y. Supp. 851)", or a bequest to a charity which fails be-
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cause of uncertainty, (Dudley v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440, 83 ·N. W. 97), or·be-
cause not made a ·sufficient length of time before the death of the testator, 
(Price v. ¥aswell, 28 Pa. 23), or if an appointment is made in excess of 
the powervf the donee, (Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357), the general rule 
is that a clause expressly revoking a "prior will or provision is not affected 
by the failure of the disposition attempted to be made. . Tupper v. Tupper, 1 
. Kay & J. 665; Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679, L. R. A 1916 C. g8, 
and µote. . Where the revocation is not expressed, but merely implied from 
a provision in the later instrument which is inconsistent with the prior dis-
position, the revocation is only to such an extent as is necessary to give ef-: 
feet to the later provision, he1we there is no revocation at all if . the later 
··. provision is vqid. Austin v. Oakes, II7 N. Y. 577, 23 N. E. 193; Eli v. M egie, 
'(N. Y. 1916), n3 N. E. Boo, semble; Duguid v:. Fras~r, 31 Ch. D. 449, 55 L. J; 
~h. 285. In the principal case, where the revocation was by express 
words, the court has advanced beyond the liolding in Duguid v. Fraser, 
where the revocation was only by implication, and says: "It d~es not 
· seem that the real point' depends upon the question of whether there 
are words of direct revocation, or whether such words are absent." 
See also Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 At}. I53. which is in ac-
'cord with the principal case, but stands alone in this country.· The question· 
in these cases must not be confuse<;\ .with the question in Onions v. Tyrer,· 1 P •. 
Wins. 343; Rudy.v. Ulrich, 6!) Pa. St. 177, and Moore v. Rowlett, 26!) Ill. 88, 
109 N; E. 682, L R. A 19i6 C. 89, and .note, where the subsequent provision 
fails because of a defect in the execution of the later instrument, or in the
0 
:capacity of the person, when it is void in toto, ~ence a clause expressly re-
vo~~ the prior instrument "falls with the devise. 
. . . , 
Wn.I.S-Pow:i;;a oF SAI.t G1vts NO Powa TO MoRTGAGt.-It was pr~vided 
in a will that the devisee of a life estate, the wife of the testator, had ''the 
right to dispose of-any property as she may think best for the purpose of 
paying all just debts or supporting or maintaining herself and children,;" 
and under this power ~e widow executed a mortgage of the fee to . the de-
fendant. The-children of the testator, who by the will were entitled to "the 
entire property reI)laining" at the death or marriage of the life-tenant, urge 
that the mortgage is not binding on th~ interest in the remainder. Held, 
that the mortgage in fee was void, since the power to sell did not include 
the power to m6rtgage, nor could she by sale or mortgage bind any interest 
in the estate except her own. Sheffield v. Grieg, (S. C. 1916) 89 S. E. 664. 
That a mere power to one to sell does not include a .power to mortgage, 
is the general rule, as followed in the instant case, especially if the one having 
the power is a mere agent or attorney. Jeffrey v. Hursh, 49 Mich. 31, 12 
N. W. 898. The executor with "entire management and control," does not 
have power to make a mortgage, (Price v. Courtney, 8g Mo. 387, 56 Am. St. 
453), nor can a trustee with power to sell and invest the proceeds, make a 
.mortgage (Hannah v. Carnahan, 65 Mich. 6o1, 32 N. W. 835). The power of 
the ,devisee of a life .estate to ·sell a fee was restricted so as not to include 
a power to mortgap;e by the application of the broad general rule, in Hoyt 
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v. Jaques, 129 Mass. 286, the court holding that "a power to sell imports a 
sale 'ottt and out' and will not authorize a mortgage, unless something in the 
will shows that a mortgage was within the intention of the testator." See 
also Bloomer v. Waldron, 3 Hill 36I. Opposed to the general rule is Zane 
v. Kennedy, 73 Pa. 182, where the court holds· that_ an "absolute and unre-
stricted power to sell includes a power to mortgage," on the theory that 
a mortgage is a conditional sale. The rule is not without its excep-
tion, for in Ball v. Harris, 4 Myl. & Cra. 264 it was said that 'it had been 
settled since the decision of Mills v. Banks, 3 P. Wms. 9 in 1724 that where 
an estate is devised with a charge imposed, or a power to rais~ a sum of 
money, power to sell includes a power to mortgage. In Loebenthal v. Raleigh, 
36 N. J. Eq. 16g, a mortgage was allowed to be made where the power to 
sell was for the purpose of raising a sum sufficient to pay de'bts, and it ap-
peared to the court that the "purpose could be answered better by mortgage 
than by sale." Where one is the devisee of a life esta~e and has the power 
to sell for "support and maintenance," many courts are inclined to modify 
the general rule and; under the power of sale to permit a mortgage. In · 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 149 Ia. 32i, 128 N. W. 38<>, the court says that a power 
to sell given to an agent, trustee, or attorney, which power is strictly con-
strued, and generally held not to include a power to mortgage, is to be dis-
tinguished from a testamentary power, given not for the .benefit and profit 
of the donor, but m: furtherance of some benefit intended to be conferred 
on the donee; and unless the intention clearly appears otherwise, the au-
thority to mortgage for the purpose expressed in the writing will be inferred. 
This modification has also been allowed· by the courts in the· cases of Kent 
v. Morrison, 153 Mass. 137, 26 N. E. 4271 IO L. R. A. 756; McCreary v. Bom-
berger, 151 Pa. 323, 24 Atl. ro66; Swarlhouth v. Ranier, 143 N. Y. 499, 38 
N. E. 726. See also 20 HARv. L. Rm-. 568, and IS Mien. L. Rm'. 331. 
WILr,s-Sor.n!ERS AND StAM~N.-The privilege provided by §n of the 
Wills Act of 1837, that any soldier being in actual military service or mariner 
or seaman being at sea may dispose of his 'personal estate as he might have 
done before the passing of the act, was claimed for each of two 1lllattested 
papers offered for probate. In the first case the deceased had volunteered 
and had lbeen ordered to report for duty in the Naval Sick Berth Service. 
The writing was executed after receiving orders to embark but before he 
had actually joined the ship. Held, that the papers were inadmissable for 
probate, for, although the deceased .was a seaman, he ·had not yet been at sea. 
Estate of Anderson, [1916] Pro. 49, 85 L. J. Pro. 21. 
In the seeond case, a female nurse had been employed on· a hospital ship 
under engagement with the War Office. When the writing was executed 
she was on shore leave but had received orders to embark. Held, that the 
paper was entitled to probate as the wi11 of a soldier "being in actual mili-
tary service." Estate of Stanley, tr916] Pro. 192, 85 L. J. Pro. 222. 
The privilege of having an informal writing probated as a will ·of per-
sonalty has been interpreted so as to be available not only to "mariners and 
seamen," both common seamen and officers, (Goods of Hays, 2 Curt. Eccl. 
Rep. 338)~ whether ~gaged in the merchant marine or naval service, (Hub-
b~rd v. Hubbard, 8 N. Y. lg6), but also to anyone employed on the shlp, 
for example, the ship cook, (.Ex Parle Thompson, 4 Bradf. 154), a female 
typist. (In the Goods of Ha~e, [1915] 2 Ir. Rep. 362), and a female nurse, 
(Estate of Stanley, supra) ; but no.t to one a passenger when the writing was 
executed, ¢.ough !by profession a mariner. (Warren v. Harding, 2 R. I. 133). 
A 11eaman is "at sea'' within the reqti.irements of the statute, while in the 
COl}J'Se of the voyage, though the vessel ~Y actually be in a port and the de-: 
cea,sed on sho~e. :.{.ay's Goods, 2 Curt. Eccl. Rep. 375. A vessel lying il;l the 
Thames ri~er preparatory to setting sail is "at sea." Goods of Patterson., 
79 L. T. N. S. 123; but where the ship remained in port for fifte~ days 
after a sailor had signed articles, a writing executed during that time was 
not privileged since the deceased had not been "at sea." Corby's Goods, 
~-Eng. L. & Eq .. Rep. 004. Nor was a vessel "at sea" when lying on the 
Mississippi river above the ebb and flow of the tide. Gi,Wt{ s Will, l Tu~er 
44- Where a soldier who had just entered the barracks attempted to make 
a will, it was held good because he had taken a steP which brought him within 
the terms of the statute, even though he had not received orders to embark. 
Goods of Hiscock, [1901] Pio. 78, 84 L. T. N. S. 61. That orders for mobili-
zation, without orders to em'bark, constituted a force in expeditione, was held 
in Gattward v. Knee, [1902] Pro. 99, 86 L. T. N. S. u9, 4 B. R. C. 895. A 
paper written by a soldie~ in camp before his company was mustered into 
the service of the United States,' was' held not entitled to probate in Von. 
Deuser v. Gordon, 39 Vt. III, and Pierce v. Pierc.e, 41) Ind. 86. Though at, 
t;he time he had facilities fc;ir making a formal will, being ill a hospital in the' 
tjty .of .Washington, a soldier was in "actual military service" who had been 
fighting at the front, but was now unable to proceed with his company 
which was still in active service. Gould v. Stafford's ~state, 39 Vt. 4g8. The 
distinction which seems to be recognized in" this country is as stated in In re 
Smith: 6 Phila. 104. .where a writing made by a soldier while home on a. fur-
lough, was offe!'."ed for probate, and the court said, ''The term 'soldiers !n 
actual military services' in«<ludes those engaged in the active duties of the 
field, whether on the march, in temporary camp, the battle, siege, or bivouac, 
but ~ never ·apply to th~ soldier who is in i:egular quarters or at his cus .. 
tomarr ho~e on leave of absence." 
